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LEGAL SHORTS
RECENT KEYNOTE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE
MONTANA PRACTITIONER
1. ARROWHEAD SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KLYAP'
The Montana Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of
liquidated damages contract provisions in Arrowhead School
District v. Klyap.
James Klyap entered into a teaching contract with the
Arrowhead School District of Park County in June 1998.2 The
terms of the contract included a $20,500 salary to Klyap, and, at
issue here, a liquidated damages clause by which Klyap would
pay the school district twenty percent of his annual salary if he
breached the contract after July 1998.3 Despite the strict
consequences, Klyap sought other employment, and, on August
12, 1998, notified the school district that he had accepted a
position with Dome Mountain Ranch. 4 Klyap initially wrote the
school district a check for $4,100, twenty percent of his annual
salary, but later stopped payment on the check. 5 The school
1. 2003 MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250.
2. Id. T7.
3. Id. 5.
4. Id. 7.
5. Id.
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district negotiated with another less experienced teacher to
replace Klyap, to whom it agreed to pay $19,500 per year.6
Arrowhead then filed suit against Klyap to enforce the
liquidated damages clause in his contract. 7 The District Court
found for the school district, and Klyap appealed.8
The Supreme Court recognized conflicting precedent con-
cerning liquidated damages in Montana.9  Historically,
liquidated damages represent an advance calculation of
expectancy damages, allowing the parties upon entering into the
contract to agree upon an equitable damage amount in the event
of a breach.' 0 However, a conflict occurs when, as here, the
liquidated damages amount exceeds reasonable expectancy
damages, and the liquidated damages clause represents a
penalty to the breaching party rather than fair compensation to
the non-breaching party. 1 This inconsistency forces courts to
balance the parties' assumed freedom to contract against
potentially unconscionable contractual terms.
In determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damages
provision, the court assesses on a case-by-case basis the level of
difficulty involved in proving expectancy damages. 12 When
difficulty of proof in itself is not determinative, the court will
look to the amount of the damages themselves.' 3 The Montana
Supreme Court notes several fallacies in this analysis. First,
determining reasonableness of damages is "circular and
subjetive," as simultaneously finding anticipated damages
reasonable and difficult to prove is counterintuitive. 14 Further,
the simple fact that a liquidated damages case is before the
court at all demonstrates the likely disparity between the
contracted damage amount and reasonable expectancy
damages.' 5  Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
allows courts to use either the anticipated or the actual damage
amount to determine reasonableness, creating an inevitable
6. Id. 8.
7. Arrowhead, 9.
8. Id.
9. Id. 19.
10. Id. 20.
11. Id.
12. Id. 24 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2003), WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, §
65:1 (4th ed. 2002), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1965)).
13. Arrowhead, 24.
14. Id. 25.
15. Id. 26.
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conflict between the parties as to which test to use. 16
Until now, Montana courts have used a combination of the
above analyses. 17 However, given the complexity of the tests,
the state caselaw is inconsistent, making standardized
conclusions "elusive at best."18  In Klyap, the Supreme Court
sets about eliminating the inconsistencies of its earlier
precedent, and abandons the requirement concerning proof
difficulties. Instead, the court holds that the enforceability of
liquidated damages should turn on whether or not the provision
is unconscionable. Under Klyap, liquidated damages provisions
have a presumption of enforceability, and the party asserting
the clause is unenforceable has the burden of showing the
provision is unconscionable. 19
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It
held that despite Klyap's lack of bargaining power, the liqui-
dated damages clause in his contract was not unconscionable, as
twenty percent of his salary was a reasonable amount of
compensation considering the extensive inconvenience to the
school in finding a replacement teacher just two weeks before
the school year began.20
In her dissent, Chief Justice Gray acknowledged the
importance of clarifying the discrepancies in existing caselaw,
but criticized the majority for taking an approach not raised by
the parties, and in effect "striking out on [its] own 'new and
improved' approach to the law."21
The Klyap case simplifies the determinative tests for
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, and will eliminate
the long-standing confusion contractual parties in Montana have
historically experienced. However, this case also represents yet
another example of the current supreme court's willingness to
disregard the arguments of the parties and address issues on
appeal not raised in the briefs, a practice which many critics
have attacked in recent years.
Amanda K Eklund.
16. Id.
17. Id. 31.
18. Id. 146.
19. Arrowhead, 49.
20. Id. 71.
21. Id. 82 (J. Gray, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2. STATE V. RAY 22
In State v. Ray, a case of first impression, the Montana
Supreme Court faced two conflicting interpretations of the
aggravated burglary statute.23 The issue presented concerned
whether a defendant who steals firearms in the course of
committing a burglary is considered "armed with a weapon."
Police arrested Christopher Ray in February 1999 in
connection with three residential burglaries in Ravalli County.24
Among the various stolen items were a significant number of
firearms, both loaded and unloaded.25 Ray was initially charged
with three counts of burglary, which prosecutors later amended
to include a fourth burglary charge and increase the original
three counts to aggravated burglary. 26 The trial court denied
Ray's motion for a directed verdict, finding that mere possession
of a weapon was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the
aggravated burglary statute.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court looked to other
states' law and determined that nearly all jurisdictions define
"armed" as "readily accessible and available for use."27  The
Montana statute defines "weapon" as any object or material that
is "readily capable of being used to produce death or serious
bodily injury."28  Such a broad definition potentially includes
nearly any tangible object, and thus, strictly construed, any
burglar could theoretically be found to possess a weapon. Thus,
a plain language interpretation of the statute would produce two
troubling results: 1) equating the terms "armed" and "weapon";
and 2) eradicating the burglary offense. 29 The court was not
willing to allow either result, and instead held that in order to
22. 2003 MT 171, 316 Mont. 354, 71 P.3d 1247.
23. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-204(2)(a) (2003). The statute provides in part:
(2) A person commits the offense of aggrevated burglary if he knowlingly enters
or remains unlawfully in an occupied structure with the purpose to commit an
offense therin:
(a) in effecting entry or in the course of committing the offense or in
immediate flight thereafter, he or another person in the offense is armed
with explosives or a weapon.
24. Ray, 8.
25. Id. 5-7.
26. Id. 9.
27. Id. 41, citing State v. Merritt, 589 A.2d 648, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); Wesolic v. State, 837 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); State v. McCaskill,
468 S.E.2d 81, 82 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(78).
29. Ray, 40.
220 Vol. 65
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be armed with a weapon, a defendant must have intended to use
the weapon. The court made clear that its opinion was limited
to the theft of firearms, 30 and made a further distinction
between loaded and unloaded firearms. Specifically, the court
held that because a burglar who steals a loaded gun in the
process of a burglary is equally as dangerous as a burglar who
brings a loaded gun with him to the burglary, the State need not
prove the intent to use a loaded weapon; mere possession is
sufficient to meet the requirements of the aggravated burglary
statute.31 In the case of the theft of an unloaded gun, the
prosecution must prove the defendant intended to use the gun.32
The court held that the State had met its burden in only one
of Ray's aggravated burglary convictions when it proved the gun
Ray had stolen was loaded.33 However, in the other aggravated
burglary conviction, the State failed to prove Ray intended to
use the unloaded gun.34 The Court, finding the State had not
met its burden of proof, reduced the conviction to burglary.35
This case marks the first judicial interpretation of "armed
with a weapon," resolving the bizarre result that under the
technical statutory definitions, a defendant who stole nearly
anything in the course of a burglary could be charged with
aggravated burglary. However, the distinction between loaded
and unloaded firearms is artificial and impractical, as burglars
are unlikely to check to see whether the guns they are stealing
are loaded. Intent to use an unloaded gun is no less sinister
than intent to use a loaded one. After State v. Ray, a defendant
who unknowingly steals a loaded gun is deemed to have the
intent to use that gun, and can be charged with aggravated
burglary. Such punishment is severe for a scenario governed too
much by chance.
Amanda K Eklund.
30. Id. 42.
31. Id. 49.
32. Id. 52.
33. Id. 57.
34. Id. 58.
35. Ray, 58.
2004
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3. STATE V. TACKITTV6
In State v. Tackitt, the Montana Supreme Court was again
asked to balance Montanans' privacy expectations and law
enforcement's commitment to stem the flow of illegal drugs into
the state. The court specifically classified the use of a drug-
detecting canine as a search, and in the same breath declared
the use of a drug-detecting canine as an exception to the
warrant requirement.
In June 2000, officers from the Northwest Drug Task Force
received an anonymous tip that James Tackitt of Kalispell,
Montana, was transporting and selling large quantities of
marijuana. The informant told the officers where Tackitt lived
and that he drove a white Subaru Legacy. The officers
corroborated the address and vehicle make. It was also
discovered another informant had previously reported to the
Flathead County Sheriffs office that Tackitt was involved in
drug trafficking in the 1990s and had a 1993 misdemeanor
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. 37
Based on the tips and law enforcement's corroboration of the
information given, a law enforcement canine, Dantz, was
enlisted to conduct a sniff survey of the exterior of the Subaru
registered to Tackitt. Dantz was walked around the vehicle by
his handler and "alerted" on the trunk of the car, indicating the
presence of drugs. 38 Using Dantz's alert at the trunk of the
vehicle and the previously mentioned information, law
enforcement applied for search warrants for the Subaru and
Tackitt's home. The search warrants were issued based on that
information. Although no drugs were found in the vehicle, three
and one-half pounds of marijuana and a bong were found in
Tackitt's home. 39
Following the searches, Tackitt was charged with criminal
possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony
in violation of Montana Code Annotated Section 45-9-103.40
Tackitt moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home,
claiming the use of a canine-sniff constituted a search in
violation of his privacy rights. Despite the fact that none of the
officers involved could remember who the informant was, the
36. 2003 MT 81, 315 Mont. 59, 67 P.3d 295.
37. Id. 6.
38. Id. 7.
39. Id. 8.
40. Id. 9 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-103 (2003)).
Vol. 65
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district court ruled Tackitt had no expectation of privacy in his
vehicle, as it was parked in an area readily accessible to the
public. Further, sufficient particularized suspicion existed to
deploy the drug-detecting canine. 41 Subsequent to the denial of
his motion to suppress, Tackitt pled guilty with a reservation of
his right to appeal.42
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court distinguished the
facts of Tackitt from those of State v. Scheetz43 using the
analysis from State v. Elison.44 In Scheetz, the court held no
expectation of privacy exists in odors emanating from checked
luggage at an airport; therefore a canine-sniff for drug odors was
not a search.45 In distinguishing between the two cases, the
court focused on an individual's expectation of privacy. In
Scheetz, travelers voluntarily relinquish possession of their
luggage, and with it a degree of privacy. In Tackitt, the canine-
sniff was of a vehicle, and "Montana's citizens have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in areas of their vehicles that are out of
plain view."46  Under the analysis in Elison, Tackitt had an
expectation of privacy in the contents of his trunk.47 Therefore,
the court concluded that the canine-sniff of Tackitt's vehicle was
indeed a search under article II, sections 10 and 11 of the
Montana Constitution.48
After the court declared the canine-sniff a search, it
analyzed the nature of the state's intrusion in order to evaluate
whether Tackitt's rights had been unreasonably violated by the
canine-sniff. The court looked to other states' laws and found
the most compelling cases created an exception to the warrant
requirement for drug-detecting canines used during police
investigations. The court required only particularized suspicion
as a prerequisite to the use of drug-detecting canines as the
"government's interest in discouraging illegal drug trafficking is
substantial."49
41. Id.
42. Tackitt, 10.
43. 286 Mont. 41, 950 P.2d 722 (1997).
44. 2000 MT 288, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456.
45. Tackitt., 18 (citing Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 50, 950 P.2d at 727).
46. Id. 20 (citing State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, 46, 302 Mont. 228, 46, 14 P.3d
456, 46).
47. Id. 21.
48. Id. 22 (Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution are the
specific privacy provisions within the document).
49. Tackitt, 29-30.
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Finally, the court looked to the four corners of the search
warrant application and held there was inadequate partic-
ularized suspicion to conduct the investigatory search of
Tackitt's vehicle.50 The court focused on law enforcement's
inability to produce the name or history of the anonymous
informant and the inability to substantially corroborate the
report of drug activities. 51 The court stated that the criminal
history information considered in the original search warrant
application was stale and should not have been considered. 52
Tackitt's conviction was reversed based on the lack of par-
ticularized suspicion prior to the use of the drug-detecting
canine.53
The court's decision in Tackitt marks yet another battle in
the ongoing war between law enforcement's rights and the
rights of individuals in Montana. In this instance the court
chose to protect privacy by classifying a canine-sniff as a search,
but at the same time categorized a canine-sniff within the few
exceptions to the search warrant requirement. The Tackitt
decision could be the first step in the court's shift towards a
more narrow approach to the interpretation and application of
Montana's constitutional privacy provisions.
Jessica T. Kobos.
4. HARDY V. PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY5 4
In Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Company, the
Montana Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of
Montana Code Annotated section 33-23-203, the Montana "anti-
stacking" provision. The court held that based upon clearly
established public policy the anti-stacking provision was uncon-
stitutional, and the ambiguous language of the insured's policy
entitled him to "stack" his underinsured motorist policies.
On December 26, 2000, Ned Hardy and his wife were
injured in an auto accident. Their vehicle was struck by another
vehicle driven by Gary Marr. As a result of the accident Hardy
suffered serious injuries. The expenses associated with Hardy's
50. Id. 33.
51. Tackitt, T 37.
52. Id. T 39.
53. Id. $T 42-43.
54. 2003 MT 85, 315 Mont. 107, 67 P.3d 892.
Vol. 65224
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injuries far surpassed Marr's liability coverage of $50,000.
Hardy claimed he was entitled to $150,000 by stacking his
coverage from his three underinsured motorists polices with
Progressive Specialty Insurance Company. Progressive based its
denial of the claim on Montana Code Annotated section 33-23-
203. 55 Hardy filed suit in United States District Court, which in
turn certified three questions to the Montana Supreme Court: 1)
Is the offset provision in the Progressive policy void in Montana
because it violates the public policy of this state; 2) Given that
under-insured motorist coverage is portable in Montana, is it
against public policy in Montana to charge separate premiums
for that coverage for separate vehicles insured on the same
policy if the insured can only collect one amount of coverage; 3)
Are insurance policies such as the one in question here, against
public policy in Montana when they include provisions that
defeat coverage for which the insurer has received valuable
consideration? 56
Hardy argued that the offset provision and the policy's
definition of underinsured motorist were in conflict with the
declarations page of the Progressive policy. 57 The court looked
to the policy's purpose and intent, construing any ambiguities in
favor of the insured, and thus of extending coverage. 58 The court
found that the declarations page established that Hardy paid
three premiums for $50,000 of underinsured motorist coverage
on three separate vehicles. 59 However, the policy's underinsured
motorist definition limits coverage to situations where the
tortfeasor's liability insurance limit is less than the stated
amount of underinsured motorist coverage. 60 The court con-
strued the ambiguity in the policy and the declaration page in
favor of Hardy. 61
It next turned to whether or not the offset provision in the
Progressive policy violated public policy in Montana. The court
looked to holdings from Bennett v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company,62 Transamerica Insurance
55. Id. 1-7.
56. Id. 2-5.
57. Id. 13.
58. Id. 14 (citing Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holeman, 1998 MT 155, 25,
289 Mont. 312, 25, 961 P.2d 114, 25).
59. Id. 16.
60. Hardy, 16.
61. Id. 19.
62. 261 Mont. 386, 389, 862 P.2d 1146, 1148 (1993) (the purpose of UIM coverage is to
2004 225
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Group v. Osborn, 63 and Chafee v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.64  The court concluded that based upon the
already discussed ambig-uities in the Progressive document's
language, it violated Montana's public policy by rendering
illusory coverage, thus defeating the insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage. 65
The court then turned to the contradiction in underinsured
motorist's personal and portable and an insured's inability to
stack separate vehicles coverage when separate premiums were
paid.66 Hardy argued that Montana Code Annotated section 33-
23-203, the "anti-stacking" provision, denies equal protection of
the law and violates the right to substantive due process in
Montana.6 7 To pass substantive due process analysis, a statute
enacted by the legislature must be reasonably related to a
permissible legislative objective. 68 In this case Progressive ar-
gued section 33-23-203 was reasonably related to keeping
insurance premiums low in Montana. The court disagreed and
instead found the "charging of customers for non-existent
coverage is the antithesis of affordable coverage."6 9 The court
concluded section 33-23-203 was not rationally related to its
stated objective and violated substantive due process in that it
allowed charging premiums for illusory coverage. 70
After determining the statute in question was con-
stitutionally infirm, the court evaluated Progressive's anti-
stacking provision in light of Montana's judicially developed
public policy. 71 In Bennett, the court held that underinsured
motorist coverage was personal and portable, creating a
reasonable expectation in an insured that coverage existed up to
the aggregate limit for each separate policy for which a premium
provide a source of indemnification when the tortfeasor does not provide adequate
indemnification through its own policy).
63. 627 F.Supp. 1405 (1986 D. Mont) (the UIM definition and the policy's offset
provision contradicted the declarations page and the reasonable expectation of the
insured).
64. 181 Mont. 1, 591 P.2d 1102 (1979) (an insured's UIM coverage cannot be limited
to one vehicle when multiple premiums have been paid on multiple policies).
65. Hardy, 29.
66. Id. 30.
67. Id. 31.
68. Id.
69. Id. 37.
70. Id. 38.
71. Hardy, 39.
226 Vol. 65
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was paid. 72 In Chaffee, the court concluded that insurers may
not limit the insured's recovery to one vehicle if an insured pays
separate premiums. 73 Based upon the decisions in Bennett and
Chaffee, the court concluded "an anti-stacking provision in an
insurance policy that permits an insurer to receive valuable
consideration for coverage that is not provided violates Montana
public policy. '74
The holding in Hardy solidifies the shift in insurance policy
in Montana. Holdings in Bennett, Transamerica, and Chaffee
marked the shift towards the stronger protection of the insured
than the insurer. However, Hardy leaves more questions than
answers. For example, can Hardy be applied retroactively, and
how far can the portable and personal nature of underinsured
motorist coverage be construed? Insurance defense Attorneys
will have to look to future Montana Supreme Court decisions to
narrow and clarify the holding in Hardy.
Jessica T. Kobos.
72. Id. 39 (citing Bennett, 261 Mont. at 389-90, 862 P.2d at 1148-49).
73. Id. 40 (citing Chaffee, 181 Mont. at 6, 591 P.2d at 1104).
74. Id. 42.
2004 227
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